At its core, Duverger's Law-holding that the number of viable parties in first-past-the-post systems should not exceed two-applies primarily at the district level. While the number of parties nationally may exceed two, district-level party system fragmentation should not. Given that a growing body of research shows that district-level party system fragmentation can indeed exceed two in first-past-the-post systems, I explore whether the major alternative explanation for party system fragmentation-the social cleavage approach-can explain such violations of Duverger's Law. Testing this argument in several West European elections prior to the adoption of proportional representation, I find evidence favouring a social cleavage explanation: with the expansion of the class cleavage, the average district-level party system eventually came to violate the two-party predictions associated with Duverger's Law. This suggests that sufficient social cleavage diversity may produce multiparty systems in other first-past-the-post systems.
Over the past few decades, party system fragmentation has increased in most advanced industrial democracies, including those not operating under proportional representation (PR). This increase in party system fragmentation has occurred despite the fact that third parties are not winning seat shares proportional to their vote shares (Best, 2010) . While this is evidence of Duverger's (1963;  see also Cox, 1997 ) 'mechanical' effect (i.e. the way that electoral systems translate votes into seats), it suggests that the 'psychological' effect (whereby third-party supporters desert parties with no chance of winning seats) is not operating as it should. Even if multiparty systems emerge in one election, electoral coordination should improve over time, resulting in fewer wasted votes and lower levels of party system fragmentation (e.g. Crisp, Olivella, and Potter, 2012; Lago and Martinez i Coma, 2012; Tavits and Annus, 2006) .
Despite arguments showing how multiparty systems may emerge at the national level while district-level competition in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems features only two parties (Cox, 1999) , recent research shows that party system fragmentation in FPTP systems often exceeds the two-party expectations of Duverger's Law (e.g. Diwakar, 2007; Gaines, 1999; Singer, 2013) . Some have made the case that this is due in part to federalism and/or multilevel elections, which allows third parties to develop in elections at one level that allows them to compete as third parties in future elections at another level (Gaines, 1999 (Gaines, , 2009 Chhibber and Kollman, 2004) . However, the fact remains that party system fragmentation exceeds two-party predictions in unitary systems as well (Raymond, 2013 ).
One is left, then, with a theoretical puzzle: if district level party system fragmentation in some FPTP systems exceeds two-party predictions, what explains the development of these multiparty systems? It may be that party system fragmentation is shaped by the social cleavage structure of society (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) . In FPTP systems, party system fragmentation at the district level may increase beyond two-party competition when the social structure becomes sufficiently diverse to sustain multiparty systems. This is in keeping with previous research, which has found that cleavage diversity may produce party systems in which the number of parties may exceed two-party predictions (Dickson and Scheve, 2010; Stoll, 2013) . Few studies have examined and confirmed such arguments at the district level in elections held under FPTP rules (see Singer [2013] for a notable exception).
One factor inhibiting the analysis of the impact of social cleavages on the development of multiparty systems is that most of the countries which have developed multiparty systems also adopted PR systems. As a growing body of research maintains (e.g. Boix, 1999 ; though see also Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice, 2007) , the choice of electoral system is endogenous to the incentives facing parties, leading party leaders to choose the electoral system that best serves their partisan interests. This complicates the estimation of social cleavage effects on party system fragmentation: it is difficult to tell if the larger party systems at the district level in PR systems is due to cleavage diversity per se because PR is seen as a necessary condition for social cleavages to produce multiparty systems (e.g. Clark and Golder, 2006; Duverger, 1963; Singer and Stephenson, 2009 ). Thus, in order to determine whether an increase in cleavage diversity is sufficient to produce and sustain multiparty systems at the district level, one would need to examine the relationship between cleavage diversity and party system fragmentation under FPTP rules.
To test the social cleavage explanation for the emergence of multiparty systems, I examine the effect that the emergence of the class cleavage in Western Europe had on district-level party systems around the time that countries began adopting PR. While previous research has documented the emergence of multiparty systems prior to the adoption of PR at the national level (Shamir, 1985) , it is possible that multiparty systems developed at the district level as well. If the conventional wisdom is correct (e.g. Cox, 1999) , multiparty systems should not have emerged at the district level, or at least should not have developed due to the emergence of the class cleavage. If the social cleavage approach is correct, then the diversification of the social cleavage structure produced sustained multiparty systems at the district level.
Data Analysis
I test the argument outlined above using data from several West European countries covering elections from the mid-to-late nineteenth century until the last election before the advent of the Second World War. The list of countries and elections includes Denmark , Germany (1874 Germany ( -1933 , the Netherlands (1888 Netherlands ( -1937 , Norway (1882 Norway ( -1936 , Switzerland (1848 Switzerland ( -1939 , and the United Kingdom (1832 Kingdom ( -1935 . While only one country (Denmark) used a pure FPTP system prior to the adoption of PR with single-member districts, I am able to simulate the conditions under pure FPTP systems through the use of a few key control variables (described below). This allows me to determine if changes in the cleavage structure-namely, the emergence of the class cleavage-were sufficient to produce and sustain multiparty competition in defiance of Duverger's Law.
The dependent variable measures average district-level party system fragmentation in each election using district-level data taken from Caramani (2000) .
1 Specifically, I calculate the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP: Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) 
Figure 1 about here
In addition to the adoption of PR, this period also saw the development of class cleavages. As people began leaving the farms for industrial work in the cities, this allowed for the emergence of leftist parties (primarily socialist, though also Communists and a few centre-left 'radical' parties) representing the working classes. Prior to the emergence of these parties, party politics in most West European countries tended to focus on two major parties:
conservatives and liberals. As a functional cleavage-meaning that individuals belonging to this cleavage are present in districts across the entire country-the emergence of the class cleavage allowed leftist parties to compete in districts across the entire country (Caramani, 2003 (Caramani, , 2004 . The greater contestation by leftist parties did not result in the displacement of one of the two existing parties. Instead, the development of the class cleavage sustained leftist parties, allowing them to compete alongside the existing conservative and liberal parties. As a functional cleavage, the development of the class cleavage produced greater party system fragmentation because it meant the expansion of the class cleavage allowed leftist parties to compete and winning more votes in more districts across the country. Europe became more diverse, producing more urban societies that increasingly divided the bourgeoisie and working classes in ways that facilitated the emergence of leftist parties to represent the working classes (whose interests did not fit neatly with those of the existing liberal and conservative parties' social bases-the bourgeoisie and upper classes). Such a development would have been favourable to leftist parties, potentially allowing them to emerge and compete alongside the existing parties in each district without significant desertion from their supporters. This suggests that the development of these multiparty systems may be due at least in part to the emergence of the class cleavage.
Figure 2 about here
In order to estimate the precise relationship between occupational diversification and district-level party system fragmentation, I include several control variables related to differences in the electoral systems of each country. Most prominent among these is a variable measuring elections held after the adoption of PR. This variable is coded one for all elections held after the adoption of PR while all other elections are coded zero.
A second variable controls for the fact that British and Swiss elections prior to the adoption of PR had district magnitudes greater than one. Because the data on the number of seats allocated to each district is not available for each election, I control for differences between elections held in single-member districts and those with district magnitudes greater than one. To do so, I include a variable coded one for elections in which mean district magnitude exceeds one, and zero otherwise, using information from Caramani (2000) regarding the use of multimember districts.
An additional control variable needed to estimate party system fragmentation in the simulated condition of a pure FPTP system differentiates between elections that used plurality rules versus those using majority rules. Because the conditions favouring strategic voting in FPTP systems largely disappear in under two-round majority rules (e.g. Cox, 1997) , party system fragmentation may exceed the two-party predictions associated with Duverger's Law in elections with majority rules even if district magnitude equals one. To account for this, I include a variable coded one for majority systems and zero otherwise.
To test the argument that PR is necessary for social cleavages to produce multiparty systems (Clark and Golder, 2006; Duverger, 1963; Singer and Stephenson, 2009 ), I interact this variable with occupational diversification. In order to determine whether the effects of occupational diversification are conditioned by the multimember district or majority system variables as well, I interact occupational diversification with both the multimember and majority system variables. If the partial effect of occupational diversification (simulating conditions in which PR had never been adopted, and thus reflecting the effect of occupational diversification in FPTP systems) reaches statistical significance, this would provide evidence that occupational diversification is able to produce multiparty systems. The results of both models are presented in Table 1 .
Table 1 about here
The results in model 1 using bootstrapped standard errors show that occupational diversification is positively and significantly associated with mean district-level party system fragmentation. 
Figure 3 about here

Conclusion
As noted above, previous research shows that party system fragmentation in FPTP systems has at times exceeded two-party predictions even at the district level. Consistent with these recent findings, the analysis performed here suggests that even if countries had not adopted PR (and even if they had all employed pure FPTP systems), the increase in cleavage diversity resulting from the emergence of the class cleavage may have facilitated the development of multiparty systems in Western Europe anyway. While it is difficult to generalise based on a sample that includes only one country using pure FPTP with singlemember districts, these results support an understanding of party systems rooted in the social cleavage approach.
Due to the difficulty of generalising based on this sample, future research is needed to confirm these findings. First, further research is needed to show that district-level multiparty systems emerge in districts where cleavage diversity is greatest, while two-party systems remain in less diverse districts, even in the absence of PR. This could be achieved by examining variation in district-level party systems in contemporary FPTP systems.
Second, more research is needed to understand why voters in FPTP systems vote nontactically (or at least seemingly so). In keeping with one of the explanations of non-tactical voting behaviour derived from Cox (1997: 79) , a social cleavage perspective holds that nontactical voting occurs because class and other social group identities lead individuals belonging to one group to care so much about their first preferences that they find parties representing other groups completely unsatisfactory. The fact that multiparty systems emerged as the class cleavage expanded supports this point: rather than desert leftist parties for the most-preferred of the remaining parties standing a better chance of winning seats, most working class voters would find liberal and conservative parties completely unacceptable representatives of their interests, and therefore would never vote tactically for either party (and likewise among most bourgeois/upper class voters). To demonstrate this point, however, further research must rule out another explanation holding that voters do not desert third parties because they lack accurate information about the parties' chances of winning (Cox, 1997: 79; Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Clough, 2007) . While some recent research casts doubt on this second argument (Raymond and Tromborg, 2014) , further research is needed to sort out which of these two arguments best explains non-tactical voting behaviour, even if the survey data needed to test such arguments are available only for recent elections. However, the results presented here do not change if these countries are excluded from the regression models.
2 To provide a more conservative measure of ENEP in the Netherlands, where there is only one district following the adoption of PR, I take the mean value of ENEP at the kamerkieskringen level (at which level party lists are established). The results treating the Netherlands as a single district from 1918-on are nearly identical to those presented here. 3 The results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of two-party dominance, namely, the (mean) percentage of votes going to parties placing third or worse in each district.
Results using this measure show that increasing class diversity yielded vote shares for parties placing third or worse that were significantly greater than zero. Another popular measure proposed to test aspects of Duverger's Law-Cox's (1997) S-F Ratio, which measures the ratio of third-and second-placed parties' vote shares (in turn allowing us to measure the degree of tactical voting across districts)-does not allow us to infer about the overall size of the party system, and therefore is not used here. 4 While linear interpolation makes the use of time-series methods problematic (as linear interpolation makes occupational diversification dependent upon time by definition), the relationship between occupational diversification and ENEP seen in Table 1 remains positive and significant after these two variables are de-trended. 5 Rather than controlling for federalism as a separate variable, this approach accounts for the effect of federalism that might lead to the development of multiparty systems (e.g. Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Gaines, 1999) . Additionally, because dynamic measures of other cleavages (ethnic, religious, etc.) are not readily available for the period under study, this approach captures country-specific variance that static measures of ethnic or religious fragmentation would estimate.
6 Random coefficients models allowing for variation in the effect of occupational diversification could not be estimated due to the small number of countries. 7 In order to determine whether the time-ordering of this relationship is correctly specified (i.e. that increases in occupational diversification produce increases in party system fragmentation, and not the other way around), I re-estimated both models using lagged occupational diversification. The results using this approach confirm the results presented here.
8 Consistent with previous research, the effect of occupational diversification is stronger in PR systems; combining the effects of PR and multimember districts shows that high levels of occupational diversification produce larger party systems in elections held under PR with multimember districts than FPTP systems. While the partial effect of majority systems is positive, the negative interaction term defies the expectations of previous research. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this finding fully, this finding suggests that the threat of a second ballot in majority systems may have done a better job of forcing inter-party cooperation than FPTP systems. When incentives for voters to vote tactically break down (Cox, 1997: chapter 4) , the fact that parties in FPTP systems can win with only a plurality may give parties incentives not to cooperate.
